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STATD'.ENT OF SErlATCR l:IKE HJ:.NSFIELD (D-HONT.)

Release Tuesday
10-16- 56

M~

THE SUEZ S ITUATION

foreien policy in the Suez crisis seems to be based on waiting for the
sands to settle .

The sands will not

set+~le

of their own accord .

He will

either act to secure a just settlement of the Suez problem or we will stand
by idly as the provocation in Suez leads to other provocations and ultimately
to the catastrophe of open conflict which will lay the Middle East in ruins,
tear apart what remains of l:festern unity, and open the channels for further
Soviet penetration into Africa and Europe.
The people of this country need to know what is involved in this crisis
in Suez and have not been told .

"!e have seen the sudden and callous seizure

of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt in a gesture both petulant and arrogant .
e have seen the British and the French n.obilize forces on Cyprus and in the

'. 1

Med iterranean to defend what to them are vital and immediate interests in the
Canal.

Me have seen the Secretary of State , "lith the best of intentions , move

into the gathering war clouds on four occasions in attempts to stop the storm.
So far no shots have been fired on Suez.
throuph the Canal .
achievement .

So far ships continue to move

Superficially, I suppose , that can be regarded as a major

ls it the case in actuality?

If it is , why do the editorials of

virtually every newspaper in this country continue to display an uneasiness
over the Suez situation?
I think it is because they r eflect the concern of the American people .
They reflect an awareness that a genuine solution of the crisis has not been
achieved just because shots

have not been fired.

"!hat has been obtained in

the Suez situation is only a prevention of a clash as of this moment and "'e
have paid a terrible price for it .

It has been paid for in something very

- 2 close to

appease~ent

of the arrogance which

a~nctes

from Cniro, an arroeance

which if it goes unchallenred will make itself felt elsewhere in the l·:iddle
It has been paid for by a further blow at the stability and unity of

East.

the free nations of 1 'estern Europe, nations in whose survival in freedom the
United States has invested more than 26 billion dollars in aid since the war,
plus heavy wartime losses in men and material.

In short, what has been obtain-

ed in the Suez crisis is a temporary respite at the pr1ce of putting off the
day of reckoning .
of that crisis ,

~fuat

has not been obtained is a just and lasting solution

I hope that now it may not be too late.

Almost six months ago, in a speech in the Senate on April 16, I urged the
Administration to act at once to forestall a crisis in the Middle East .

I

pointed out the need to bring together as many nations as possible pledged to
preserve peace in the Hiddl e East in these terms :

11

We should begin now, in

cooperation with others, to plan the measures which may be necessary to prevent a major outbreak of violence in the Middle Eest or to stop one if it
should occur,

The Tripartite Declaration of 1950, in my opinion, is inadequate

to the needs of the present situation.,

Dangerous and difficult measures may

be required to keep the peace and the sacrifices entailed should be shared on
the widest possible scale , 11

I urged the Administration to call an immediate

conference on the petroleum supply problems which might result from a crisis
in the Hiddle East in these terms:
~!estern

11

\·le should call at once a conference of the

European nations which depend on Middle Eastern petroleum and the oil-

producing nations of this hemisphere.

If the peace is to be kept in that

area , measures may have to be taken which will shut off, at least temporarily,
\·!estern Europe's major source of petroleum,

The immediate problem is to firrl

alternatives not only to the oil but to the income which the production
processing of oil represents to certain Western European countries . "

ar~

- .3 t-icnths went by enu nothing was done while the ten9ion continued to mount .
Then when the crisis 111as upon us , action along these lines was at last taken,
belated end halting action .

Had the Pdministretion acted firmly and clearly

six months ago, it is likely

th~t

remedies .

we would not now be hunting for last-d i tch

The pr esent crisis might never have arisen .

Je have no choice now but to acknowledge the damage which has result ed from

1

delay and vaccination in dealing with the Middle Eastern situation .

~le

have no

choice but to face the fact that we are confronted with a new situation, one
which contains greater risks , one which will cost more to cope with.

t.Je had

better recognize , too , that if we do not e.ct now , it will become even more risky
and costly in the near future .
The principal fact in this ne"1 situation is that President Nasser is in
possession of the Suez Canal Company, on dubious legal grounds perhaps, but nevertheless he is in possession .
force which , if used by the

He will not be quickly dislodged except by military
~/estern

power s, is likely to solidify the Arab world

under his leadershi p and win for him, however reluctantly, the support of the
peoples of Asia and Africa.
There is another fact in the situation , however, a fact which works for a
just sol ution of this problem .
ered international passage ,

For a lonf t i me Suez has been a route of unhamp-

In that sense , it is international .

will not acquiesce in the misuse of the
nationalist political ambitions,

c ~ nal

Wor ld opinion

by Nasser or anyone else to further

World opinion can be made to bear fruit in this

situation if it is effectively mobilized and led .
Secretary Dulles in the Suez negotiations has adopted the role of tho
11

honest broker" between the vlest and Egypt on the one hand and en the other he

has been able to keep together a western united front of sorts .

The result is
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that while he has not won friends on either side, his analysis before the
Security Council of the United Nations, in drawing attention away from Ecypt•s
in~

act of nationalization and pinpointJthe issue upon ways and means of guaranteeing free international access to the canalhas been reasonable, understanding,
and could, if followert throUF,h with good intent by both sides , produce successful
results ,
On the basis of these facts and possibilities , therefore , it seems to me
any hope of a peaceful solution to the Suez crisis must be sought alonE the fol lowing lines :
1,

Acceptance of the riEht of E€ypt to nationalize the canal,

with just conpensation of the present Sue Canal Company owners, provided
Egypt allows free and

unha~pered

rieht of passage to ships of

!~~

nations in

time of peace or war in accord with the Convention of 1888 ,
2,

If an agreement is not reached in the U, N. , the User's

Associat:i on , so- called , which l-ir . Dulles has formed, must be strenrthened
into an orfanization of sufficient cooperation and resources to see to it
that it will be E.fypt rather the.n the rest of the "'orld that suffers from
a failure to keep the Canal open to all nations.
The User ' s Association should be

ur~ed

to consider nerotiations on the adop-

tion of the followine measures in case of the failure of the U. N.
1.

Establishment of a Suez sealift to mcve i•lid- F.astern petroleum

around the Cape of Good Hope , based on a cooperative use of the tanker
capacity of member- nations ; release out of mothballs of 35 United States
tankers ; and a crash building program on 70, 000 to 100, 000 ton tankers .
2.

The intensification of petroleum production in this country

and the Western Hemisphere generally ,
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3. A crash program on the application of nuclear enerey
to power production.
4.

The establishment of a

~l

billion interest- free revolving

fund contributed by member- nations, in accordance with their capacity,
to alleviate nat1.ons hard hit by measures taken by the Users 1 Association to preserve the international right of transit through the Suez
Canal .
The need for these measures, which are costly and difficult , has been occasioned by the impasse which now faces the
their foreign policies .

~'estern

nations in the conduct of

I hope we have seen an end to the stalling and the

failure which has marked our efforts to date.

If we have not, the next price

to be paid may well be a bloodbath in the Middle East made to order for the
cheap extension of totalitarian communist influence in that region .

